Someone asked if Condorcet's
Criterion & FBC are compatible. No.
Say you rank Compromise, C, in 1st place, to beat Worst, W.
C wins, as CW.
But say you & a few other voters had added your favorite, F, to top rank, with C.
Now you're no longer helping protect C from being beaten by F. Now F beats C.
That sounds good, but maybe W beats F, making a top-cycle.
Maybe the Condorcet completion method chooses W.
By moving Favorite to top, you've changed the winner from Compromise to Worst.
That's shabby. It won't happen every time, but neither is it very improbable.
The method ICT says:
Voting 2 candidates at top counts as a vote against either beating the other.
The winner is:
1. The most top-ranked unbeaten candidate.
2. If none are unbeaten, the most top-ranked candidate wins.
(end of ICT definition)
ICT meets FBC, has no chicken-dilemma, and meets a form of the Condorcet Criterion that better honors the voter's intent:
You don't top-rank 2 candidates because you want to make one of them lose.
ICT was introduced by Chris Benham, based on Kevin Venzke's better Condorcet Criterion.
Because ICT meets FBC, has no chicken dilemma, & meets a better Condorcet Criterion, I propose ICT as the best.
By the way, MJ doesn't meet MMC, contrary to what some web articles say.