Strategic Hedge Simple Score Is The Only Worthwhile Method

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Strategic Hedge Simple Score Is The Only Worthwhile Method

This is from an initial portion of a book I am presently writing, to be published somewhere on the Internet.

Actually a real democracy would be a really great thing. All the people would study just enough about the issues to elect other people who would study the issues full-time and make sound decisions. However, as things stand today (and in all the past), the people never really get to elect anybody, but rather they merely get to choose between two bosses who are mere tools of a cabal of shadow government pirates. Anyone who has "gone to the polls" a few times has to eventually become at least dimly aware that at the end of the day their nominal participation has, 99% of the time, counted for absolutely nothing.

So, since they are all but completely powerless, it is totally irrational for ordinary citizens to devote any of their valuable time to any serious study of any political issues. Other than as a sort of casual hobby, it is a foolish waste of your time to do that. So the ordinary citizen cannot be faulted for being effectively oblivious to the true nature of the various political issues.

Under the terms of the present U.S. regime, which uses single-selection voting (also absurdly called "plurality" or "first past the post" voting), the elections for members of the House of Representatives, and perhaps for the presidency, would have significant potential to provide voter power if the voting systems were structured in a proper manner. But as things currently stand, they most certainly do not. And this disaster is completely due to the existence of something called the "spoiler effect". As an obvious example, consider the 2000 presidential election in Florida between George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader. To many people, Nader was seen as a great candidate, while Bush was seen in a light not unlike how Hillary Clinton appeared in 2016, a clear abomination. Yet many voted for Gore, since to do otherwise would increase the risk of a Bush election (although Bush won anyway, and we had 9/11, social lockdown, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). So the existence of this spoiler effect means that we cannot have any realistic choices except between two bosses pre-selected by the shadow government pirates.

I have discussed the strategic hedge simple score voting method in many places. With this you get to give, say, between 5 and 10 votes to each of as many candidates as you prefer. This would destroy the two-party system. Obviously the common voters must vote strategically since the shadow government pirates will always operate strategically. The whole "voting systems" / "election methods" field is a gigantic mess, sprawling over at least 100 pages of Wikipedia, for example. And I have written hundreds of pages about this subject. The insane complexity, futility, and excessiveness of the various odd methods, "criteria", and whatnot proposed by this "industry" amounts to a conspiracy. It always treats extremely consequential elite interest elections just as if they were merely casual hobby club elections.

In reality, elections are not primarily contests between individual candidates -- They are contests between common voters and shadow government pirates -- And this is just what the election methods industry always completely ignores.

For instance, one division of the election methods (or "social choice") industry called "FairVote" has convinced the U.S. Green Party to throw its entire weight behind a very well-advertised election method known as "IRV" (a.k.a. "ranked choice voting"). This "IRV" sounds wonderful, yet wherever it is used the common voters always lose and the shadow government pirates always win. And it's very worthwhile to note who provides the funding for FairVote:

http://www.fairvote.org/financials

This should not be surprising.

I'm trying to make some sense

I'm trying to make some sense of this post. Is it written by an AI? Can an AI be this angry?

"With this you get to give, say, between 5 and 10 votes to each of as many candidates as you prefer." - I can interpret this in one of two ways. (1) You have, as an example, 5 votes to cast however you choose. Those 5 votes could be divided among candidates in any way the voter chooses. (2) Each voter can score each candidate on a scale from 5 to 10.

Interpretation (1) is equivalent to plurality / single choice / whatever. Interpretation (2) is range voting with a strange scale.

"The insane complexity, futility, and excessiveness of the various odd methods, "criteria", and whatnot proposed by this "industry" amounts to a conspiracy." - There are indeed a lot of voting methods that could be used, and the criteria they each do or do not satisfy are an important part of evaluation and comparison. You are citing a criteria yourself. The spoiler effect is a manifestation of the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives criteria. (As a hobbyist I don't fully understand all the details and relationships here, but I think this is "mostly correct" in any case.) I don't see election science as an industry, and I don't see the connection between these criteria (which are purely mathematical) and conspiracy. I see a combination of scholarly debate (which the OP is not) and political jaw-flapping (the OP).

You disparage IRV, but that method does cure the spoiler effect. Other methods including range voting also effectively removes this effect. If that's the only thing you care about, why do you not like IRV? And why should "casual hobby club elections" use a method any worse or better than state elections? The goal of accurate representation is usually the same.

I don't understand how any given election method can solve the problems inherent to political parties. A successful candidate in any representative democracy will need the help of influential mass media. I do believe that a two-party system brings out the worst in political parties, and that a spoiler effect in voting virtually guarantees a landscape dominated by exactly two parties. But you can also arrive at two parties by other means. We cannot solve this problem in the US without election reform, and we cannot solve this problem by election reform alone.

Strategic Hedge Overcomes Approval's Double Bind Quandary

As pointed out in the article above, all we need to do is to overcome the spoiler effect. That will be enough to overwhelm the two-party system, and thus empower the common voters to outflank the shadow government pirates. We do not need systems that fulfill all sorts of arcane "criteria" and that are described in terms of reams of scientific-sounding jargon. All that needs to be done is to effectively disrupt the spoiler effect, while keeping both the casting and the counting of votes non-automated, decentralized, and as simple and easy to perform as possible. That really is all we need.

Study -- Politicians listen to rich people, not to you:

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Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule -- at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not obtain it.

See the very revealing graph:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article...
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It is absolutely terrifying that the election methods (or "social choice") industry drones on and on about hundreds of arcane methods, criteria, and theories while a cabal of shadow government pirates is rapidly building a vast political prison around us with election automation such as voting computers -- which they control. Giant corporations are contributing millions of dollars promoting "IRV" (now being called ranked choice voting) which obfuscates, but ultimately does nothing to remedy the spoiler effect. Some systems defined by simple rules, such as ranked choice voting, can produce outcomes with extremely complex ramifications, and corruption thrives on complexity. Check this out:

/~~~~~~~~~~
Fair Representation Act: Change House elections from “winner take all” to “ranked choice voting.”

The bill was introduced on June 26 [2017] by Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA8), labeled in the House as H.R. 3057. It has 3 cosponsors: Khanna, Ro [D-CA17] (joined Jun 26, 2017), Raskin, Jamie [D-MD8] (joined Jun 26, 2017), Cooper, Jim [D-TN5] (joined Jul 17, 2017)

https://govtrackinsider.com/fair-representation-act-would-be-the-most-co...
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The ongoing debacle that has been created by our single-selection voting (also absurdly called "plurality" or "first past the post" voting) system is rapidly culminating in a condition of permanent "two-party" tyranny, of the bosses, by the bosses, and for the bosses.

Unfortunately it appears that my descriptions of the objectives and procedures of strategic hedge simple score voting (SHSSV) tend to often be misunderstood. I have said: "With this [method] you get to give, say, between 5 and 10 votes to each of as many candidates as you prefer." Some people wonder if it is what has been called "cumulative voting", whereby each voter is allotted a fixed number of points, say ten, and is permitted to distribute them among candidates in any way they please, and the candidate with the most points wins the election. No -- it is not cumulative voting. Rather, for example, a voter could grant 10 votes to each of 5 candidates, and 8 votes to each of three candidates (and so on).

Another question that comes up with regularity is "why give between 5 and 10 votes, instead of 0 to 9 votes"?  From a procedural/mathematical perspective SHSSV would work just as well if 0 to 9 votes could be given. The trouble seems to be that election methods theorists tend to focus tightly on the merits of procedures, while neglecting fundamental objectives. After all, procedures should be adjusted according to objectives; objectives should not be adjusted according to procedures. First off, things can go wrong if "0 votes" can be given. Election officials (usually in thrall to shadow pirates) could insist that any ballot not "filled out in full", which could include ballots bearing candidates who were given no score, should be a "void ballot" (i.e. a "spoiled ballot"). This alone should justify allowing voters to abstain from giving some candidates any score whatsoever, and an abstention would have the same consequence as giving a "0 vote".

Also, a gang of trolls could always write someone in and give them all "0 votes", or low-score votes, which would constitute harassment and embarrassment. The ever-untrustworthy election officials might well be tempted to somehow pervert the process to prevent this. The ability to grant 5 to 10 votes should be more than sufficient for voters to thwart the shadow pirates by employing the hedge strategy.

Approval voting, whereby voters can grant just one (1) vote to as many candidates as they approve of suffers from a "double bind quandary". Suppose the voters using the approval method are presented with three candidates: two of which are shadow pirate supported (presumably a Republican and a Democrat), and one of which is truly desired. They will have a quandary. Should they vote for both the desired and the lesser-evil shadow pirate candidate, or just for one or the other of these two, so as to contribute to the optimal, or at least lesser evil outcome? I presume that for most voters this is simply undecidable. Perhaps this should be called the "triple bind quandary", and it could result in desired, non-shadow pirate candidates almost never becoming elected. SHSSV effectively thwarts this quandary. Since the voters could grant 10 votes to a desired candidate, but perhaps only 8 or 9 to the lesser evil shadow pirate candidate, the desired one would have a substantially better chance of winning. And people love to play strategies against despised opponents; they tend to like poker, for example. With SHSSV, proper strategy sometimes requires strategic hedge voting. So-called "bullet voting", or goody-goody voting (so-called "honest" voting) would be self-defeating voter malpractice.

Many theorists emphasize a concept of "expressiveness", which I find rather odd. The concept seems to be that the more information an individual can enter into a system, the better it is, since it's more "expressive".  Suppose you find yourself in an arena with three boxes that you can open, one with a beautiful lady and two with ferocious man-eating tigers. You are to guess which of the three to open. All of a sudden the Emperor stops the show, and then adds three more boxes with tigers. Should you now be happy to have enhanced expressiveness, with six boxes to choose from instead of only three? I will give you a lottery ticket potentially worth a billion dollars. You decide if you want me to guess the winning number and fill it in, or if you want to do that yourself. The latter case is much more expressive for you, even though the tickets bear exactly the same value. In New York City, there are sometimes walk-light buttons referred to as "placebo buttons" as in many locations they appear to have no effect. Yet they all provide the same degree of expressiveness. Degree of expressiveness depends on the nature of systems, not so much on the amount of information entered. The concept originated in the early days of the discovery of second order logic, and second order logic is provably more expressive than first order logic. Then it was adopted in computer science, where it is an essentially subjective notion. It means next to nothing in regard to the evaluation of election methods.

Here are a few ancillary points. In the U.S., many more legislators are direly needed. Especially if we wish to institute proportional representation. And we must avoid term limits for congresspeople. One-term officials can never gain a track record, which is the only thing that can inform the voters about where they truly stand. What we really need is yearly re-election of every congressperson. And strategic hedge simple score voting (SHSSV) of course.

Prelude To A Prospective Local Score Voting Campaign

I am assessing a potential local campaign to procure score (a.k.a. range) voting for my city and state. It would seem impractical to advocate multiple radical changes, so I would only advocate "bare-bones" score voting. There would be no effort to instigate rational redistricting, or proportional representation. Such "bare-bones" score voting would be nearly as effective for thwarting the spoiler effect, and helping "unsung" candidates as full-fledged strategic hedge simple score voting. I would propose a simple version of score voting with scores from 1 to 5. Simple abstention would perform the function of a "0 vote". However, the latter could invite polling officials to declare non fully-filled-in ballots to be void, and generally grant unnecessary power to ballot drafters and counters.

I will never campaign for approval voting, which is seriously problematic. I am frankly quite disturbed that the Center for Election Science has been promoting approval voting. In the strongest terms I implore the staff of that organization to stop promoting this profoundly flawed method. To describe serious problems that voters will eventually encounter with this method, I can only reiterate what I stated before:

/~~~~~~~~~~
Approval voting, whereby voters can grant just one (1) vote to as many candidates as they approve of suffers from a "double bind quandary". Suppose the voters using the approval method are presented with three candidates: two of which are shadow pirate supported (presumably a Republican and a Democrat), and one of which is truly desired. They will have a quandary. Should they vote for both the desired and the lesser-evil shadow pirate candidate, or just for one or the other of these two, so as to contribute to the optimal, or at least lesser evil outcome? I presume that for most voters this is simply undecidable. Perhaps this should be called the "triple bind quandary", and it could result in desired, non-shadow pirate candidates almost never becoming elected. SHSSV effectively thwarts this quandary. Since the voters could grant 10 votes to a desired candidate, but perhaps only 8 or 9 to the lesser evil shadow pirate candidate, the desired one would have a substantially better chance of winning. And people love to play strategies against despised opponents; they tend to like poker, for example. With SHSSV, proper strategy sometimes requires strategic hedge voting. So-called "bullet voting", or goody-goody voting (so-called "honest" voting) would be self-defeating voter malpractice.
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Until we overcome the spoiler effect induced two-party system and empower "unsung" candidates we will all be trapped in pseudo-democratic tyranny. I have determined that approval voting would not adequately accomplish this. And ranked choice (eg. "IRV") would be even worse than our present single selection voting method.

If enough communities adopt score voting, there will at least exist a body of citizens to complain about the imposition of ranked choice voting, which might be mandated by a bill currently in Congress (in case you missed it):

/~~~~~~~~~~
Fair Representation Act: Change House elections from “winner take all” to “ranked choice voting.”

The bill was introduced on June 26 [2017] by Rep. Don Beyer (D-VA8), labeled in the House as H.R. 3057. It has 3 cosponsors: Khanna, Ro [D-CA17] (joined Jun 26, 2017), Raskin, Jamie [D-MD8] (joined Jun 26, 2017), Cooper, Jim [D-TN5] (joined Jul 17, 2017)

https://govtrackinsider.com/fair-representation-act-would-be-the-most-co...
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Even though I am a seasoned anti-war activist, I find it challenging to imagine where to begin with my local campaign. Perhaps pamphlets and fliers would be a good start-up vehicle. It's hard to do anything without backers, and it's been awhile since I've done that kind of organizing. Good luck to the rest of you here in following your ideals!

I (blues) can be contacted at:

reaver Delete this sentence. at And this one. polarismail And this one. dot And this one. net

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